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INTRODUCTION 
 
The signing of the Declaration of Independence, the death 
of Abraham Lincoln, Elvis’ final concert, and the invention of 
the light bulb;  All of these events and dozens of others that 
changed history have at least one common element – they happened 
indoors, inside historic American interiors. 
The need to preserve artifact of civilization has made 
itself felt since at least as far back as the Roman Empire; 
Emperor Majorian, circa 453 A.D. “was anxious to protect 
monuments of those ages in which he would have desired and 
deserved to live.”1  Like their Roman counterpart, American 
leaders keenly felt this need for safeguarding the architectural 
record of the past.  Americans enacted the first local 
legislation protecting historically or architecturally 
significant private property in Charleston, South Carolina in 
1931.2   
Since these first efforts to introduce protection for 
important historic structures into the legal canon, the volume 
and scope of historic preservation law has grown enormously.  In 
1972, the United States Preservation Commission Identification 
                                                 
1 Scott H. Rothstein, Takings Jurisprudence Comes in From the Cold: Preserving  
Interiors Through Landmark Designation, 26 Conn. 1105, 1108 (FN2)(1994). 
2 Id. at 1108. 
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Project identified 492 local historic preservation commissions.3  
Five years later in 1981, that number had nearly doubled to 832.4  
By 1998, the last year for which data is available, the number 
had exploded to 2 368 historic preservation commissions 
nationwide.5 
 
The Rise of Interior Preservation 
 
Concomitantly with the proliferation of historic 
preservation commissions, the authority of these commissions to 
regulate more than mere exterior features also grew.  This 
authority expanded, notably, into interior landmarking.   
In 1988, the City of Boston Law Department published an 
update of a survey that had previously been conducted by the 
National Center for Preservation Law.6  The Center had surveyed 
465 local landmark commissions, of which 139 responded.7  Of 
these 139, only 22 believed they had authority to landmark 
interiors.8  Just 11 said they had made such designations already 
                                                 
3 Connie Malone and Pratt Cassity, The United States Preservation Commission 
Identification Project, available at 
http://www.uga.edu/sed/pso/programs/napc/pdfs/uspcip94.pdf (1994). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Albert H. Manwaring, American Heritage at Stake: The Government’s Vital 
Interest in Interior Landmark Designations, 25 New Eng. L. Rev. 291, 293 
(FN11)(1990). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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or were otherwise regulating interiors.9  This survey represents 
a cross-section of the burgeoning development of interior 
preservation in the late 1980s. 
Regarding the developing case law in this early period of 
interior preservation, an article in the Fall 1990 issue of the 
New England Law Review noted the following: 
The battle between property owners and historic 
preservationists recently moved to the interiors of 
our significant buildings.  Thus far, only three cases 
have challenged the police power authority of state 
and local governments to protect building interiors 
under landmark laws.  But with the increasing tendency 
of municipal governments to designate and regulate 
building interiors as landmarks, there will be many 
more challenges to this authority in the future.10 
 
During the late 1980s, and certainly by 1990, it must have 
seemed that interior preservation was at least one of the facets 
of historic preservation that was just beginning to make a name 
for itself. 
 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 317,318. 
 3
Johnathan Lloyd, Historic Preservation, Tersh Boasberg 
Interior Preservation Now 
 
So where has interior preservation law gone since 1990?  
Did the New England Law Journal article correctly predict a long 
and colorful life for interior preservation, full of litigation, 
constitutional challenges, commentary, scholarship…? 
The history of historic preservation law is somewhat 
difficult to reconstruct.  However, certain sources do offer a 
glimpse of the major events that mark this history: 
o The article from the New England Law Journal cited above 
refers to two cases that had already dealt with interior 
preservation: Weinberg v. Barry (1986), and Sameric Corp. 
v. City of Philadelphia (1989).11 
o A 1994 article from the Connecticut Law Review cites two 
of the three interior preservation cases mentioned above, 
plus two others: Shubert Organization v. Landmarks 
Preservation Commission (1991), and Teachers Insurance & 
Annuity Ass’n of America v. City of New York (1992).12 
o The Fall 1994 issue of Urban Lawyer cites the conclusion 
of Sameric Corp. in it’s article titled “Recent 
Developments in Historic Preservation and Architectural 
                                                 
11 Id. at 318. 
12 Manwaring, supra note 6, at 122, 123. 
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Control Law.”13  This is the only case it cites related to 
interior preservation.  This is also the last time a case 
dealing directly with interior preservation was mentioned 
in Urban Lawyer’s “Recent Developments.” 
o The 2002 issue of the Widener Law Symposium Journal 
publishes an article entitled, “Avoiding the ‘Disneyland 
Façade’: The Reach of Architectural Controls Exercised by 
Historic Districts Over Internal Features of 
Structures.”14  The article cites no interior preservation 
cases not mentioned above.15 
o American Land Planning Law Database, § 75:13 Designation 
of landmark interiors cites to two cases mentioned 
already.16  The database’s most recent update was in July 
2007.17 
o Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 19:17 
Interiors cites three cases mentioned already.18  The 
                                                 
13 Bradford J. White, Recent Developments in Historic Preservation and 
Architectural Control Law, 26 Urb. Law. 777 at 777. 
14 Robert W. Mallard, Avoiding the “Disneyland Façade”: The Reach of 
Architectural Controls Exercised by Historic Districts Over Internal Features 
of Structures, 8 Widener L. Symp. J. 323 at 324. 
15In 2002, Mallard writes, “while preserving the exterior of homes in historic 
districts is commonplace, most states do not include interiors in their 
preservation-enabling legislation.”  Id.  Is this more evidence of neglect of 
historic preservation? 
16 Norman Williams, Jr. and John M. Taylor, American Land Planning Law 
Database, § 75:13 (Rev. Ed.) (2007). 
17 Id. 
18 Edward H. Zeigler, Jr., Arden H. Rathkopf, and Daren A. Rathkopf, 
Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 19:17 (4th Ed.) (2008).  
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database was updated in April 2008, although this section 
was last updated in June 1997.19 
  It appears not only that the academic treatment of interior 
preservation has been spare at best, but also that  
a mere handful of cases spanning less than a decade is all there 
is to show for the copious jurisprudence predicted in 1990. 
What has sealed the case law on interior preservation 
against constitutional attack?  What about these landmark cases 
has made interior preservation almost unquestionably 
constitutional? 
 
This paper examines takings and due process challenges in 
the leading cases that galvanized the constitutionality of 
interior preservation. These cases together form the shield that 
protects interior designations from constitutional attack.  This 
paper’s goal is to distill the critical points that have left 
the jurisprudence on interior preservation all but bare for much 
more than a decade. 
 
THE CASE LAW 
 
A legal genealogist tracing the lineage of interior 
preservation law finds his Adam in Penn Central.20  Lawyers and 
                                                 
19 Id. 
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legal scholars have no trouble recognizing this case as a 
watershed in the field of historic preservation.  Better known, 
certainly, for its contributions in the realm of exterior 
preservation law, the case has no less significance in the 
province of interior preservation. 
 
Penn Central (1978) 
  Exterior and interior of Grand Central Station 
 
Grand Central Terminal is a French Beaux Arts rail terminal 
at the intersection of 42nd Street and Park Avenue in New York 
City.21  The building was opened in 1913.22  The terminal was 
owned by Penn Central Transportation Corporation (Penn Central), 
who was also the proprietor of a number of other important 
properties in Midtown Manhattan.23  New York’s Landmarks 
Preservation Commission (Commission) designated Grand Central 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
21 Id. at 115. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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Terminal a “landmark” in August of 1967.24  The following month, 
the Board of Estimate (the Board) confirmed the designation, as 
prescribed by New York City’s Landmark Preservation Law.25 
Although Penn Central opposed the landmark designation 
before the Board, it failed to take advantage of its right to 
judicial review of the decision.26 
The year after the designation, Penn Central leased the 
airspace above the train terminal to UPG Properties.27  The terms 
of the lease called for the construction of a multistory office 
building above the station.28  Renowned Hungarian architect 
Marcel Breuer prepared two proposals for the design of the new 
addition.29  Owing to the new landmark designation, Penn Central 
and UPG were forced to seek approval of the plans from the 
Commission.30  The Commission rejected both proposals as 
incompatible with the historic design of the terminal, denying 
the necessary certificate of no exterior effect and certificate 
of appropriateness.31  
Penn Central filed suit in the New York Supreme Court.32  
After winning here, the Appellate Division reversed, and Penn 
                                                 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 116. 
26 Id. 
27 Id.  The agreement was made on January 22, 1968. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 117. 
32 Id. at 119. 
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Central appealed.33  The New York State Court of Appeals 
affirmed.34  The case finally came before the United States 
Supreme Court.35 
Penn Central alleged that New York’s Landmark Preservation 
Law, by denying their proposal to build the new addition to the 
terminal, wrought a taking without just compensation in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.36  In an opinion by Justice 
Brennan, the court held that three factors are particularly 
relevant to courts’ consideration in deciding cases alleging 
takings:37 
1) “the economic impact of the regulation on the 
[owner]”;  
2) “the extent to which the regulation had interfered 
with distinct investment backed expectations"; and  
3) “the character of the governmental action.”38 
 
Although the specific facts of this case do not touch on 
interior landmarking, every case that does cites to its opinion.  
What is it about this decision that makes it such a boon to 
interior preservation?   
As a preliminary matter, it seems clear that this case has 
had the fortunate effect of giving the constitutional go-ahead 
to municipalities to create their own historic preservation 
ordinances.  As historic designation became more widespread, the 
                                                 
33 Id.  1975. 
34 Id. at 120.  1977. 
35 Id. at 122.  Argued April 17, 1978. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 124. 
38 Id. at 124. 
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pressure to begin protecting historic interiors as well as 
exteriors certainly mounted as well.  It may be thanks to this 
mounting pressure and the efforts by local landmarking 
commissions to relieve it that the subsequent cases came along 
at all. 
Regarding specific protections against takings challenges, 
this case first makes it absolutely clear that mere diminution 
of value does to constitute a taking.39  This one principle alone 
appears again and again in the subsequent interior designation 
cases, and its impact can hardly be overestimated. 
 
                                                 
39 Id. at 105. 
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Weinberg v. Barry (1986) 
 
  Exterior and screen room of the Warner Building 
 
A takings challenge was again the central issue in Weinberg 
v. Barry.40  The property that is the central object of this case 
is the Warner Building in downtown Washington, D.C.41  The City 
designated a portion of the building’s exterior and a portion of 
the building’s interior, a theater, as an historic landmark.42  
Plaintiff brought suit against the Mayor of the District of 
Columbia, claiming that the D.C. ordinance allowing for the 
designation of building interiors was facially unconstitutional 
                                                 
40 Weinberg v. Barry, 634 F.Supp. 86 (1986). 
41 Id. at 87. 
42 Id. 
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and effected a taking without just compensation in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment.43   
Then as now, the only reference to interior designation in 
the D.C. historic preservation statute occurs in the definitions 
section:  Under the statute, “alter” or “alteration” includes 
any “change in any interior space that has been specifically 
designated as an historic landmark.”44  Interestingly, however, 
plaintiffs did not contend that this fleeting reference to 
interior designations was insufficient to give the Commission 
authority to make them.  Nor has this authority of the D.C. 
Historic Preservation Commission under the statute ever been 
called into question before the court. 
Plaintiffs argued that a private interior space, such as 
the theater of the Warner building, could only be a benefit to 
the public if it were forcibly opened for public viewing.45  
Forcing the building open would produce an invasion of private 
property impermissible under Loretto, and rob owners of the 
profitable uses of their own property.46  Thus no law providing 
for the designation of interiors as historic landmarks could 
possibly pass constitutional muster.47   
                                                 
43 Id. at 92. 
44 D.C. St. 6-1102(1)(b). 
45 Weinberg, 634 F.Supp. at 93. 
46 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
47 Weinberg, 634 F. Supp. at 92. 
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The Court firmly rejected plaintiff’s argument that that 
interior designation only serves the public interest if the 
government requires public access to the building.48  The Court 
noted first that the stated purposes of the D.C. preservation 
act include much more than visual enjoyment, citing the economic 
benefits of attracting visitors to the city.49 
But even if the public interest required that the public be 
allowed to see the interior firsthand, as the plaintiff argued, 
the court found that the interior designation would still not 
affect a taking.50  Nor did the Court find that it would be 
necessary to mandate the opening of the building to the public 
in violation of the private property rights of the owner.51  
Many, if not most or all of the economically viable uses for 
this and other historic interiors depend upon the owner 
voluntarily inviting the public inside.52  Restaurants, retail 
shops, hotels and theaters (as in this case) all give the public 
access to their interiors without the need for government 
directive. 
Readers should note that although the court did not 
incorporate them into its opinion, the purposes of the D.C. Act 
offer perhaps more possibilities for rationalizing the 
                                                 
48 Id. at 93. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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protection of historic interiors regardless of the public’s 
access to them.53 
The D.C. Act states among its purposes, “to safeguard the 
city’s cultural, social, economic, political and architectural 
heritage.”54  D.C.’s Historic Preservation Review Board will 
still accomplish this purpose if it designates as landmarks 
historic interiors that have no prospect whatever of ever being 
open to the public.  This is, in fact, the logical conclusion of 
the reasoning employed some years after Weinberg by the Sameric 
court.  It held that even if an interior were completely closed 
to the public, the legitimate purposes of historic landmark 
designation might well be upheld, if only to preserve the space 
with the prospect that some future owner might make a more 
public use of it.55 
One might even argue that designating interiors to which 
the public has no access more effectively “safeguard[s] the 
city’s cultural, social, economic, political and architectural 
heritage,” than designating those into which the touching, 
prying, trampling hoi polloi regularly intrude. 
                                                 
53 See Sass Silver, Not Brick by Brick: Development of Interior Landmark 
Designation 
Policies in Washington, D.C. (2002), 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=georgetown/hpp
s (Further discussing interior preservation in D.C.) 
54 D.C. St. § 6-1101(a)(2). 
55 Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 558 A.2d 155, 158 (1989). 
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By upholding this and other purposes of the D.C. Act as 
Constitutionally valid, the court leaves the door wide open to 
arguments like this one that, though they greatly enhance the 
likelihood that historic interiors will gain legal protection, 
also greatly attenuate the public’s link to benefits professedly 
“in the public interest.” 
While this result is perhaps undesirable as a policy 
matter, it does make defending interior preservation all the 
easier.  By allowing the attenuation of the link to the public 
interest, the court greatly reduces the realm of what 
constitutes a taking without just compensation. 
 
Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia (1989) 
 
  A screen room and the lobby of the Boyd Theater 
 
Sameric proposed essentially the same argument against 
landmarking Philadelphia’s Boyd Theater that Weinberg had used 
to oppose landmarking the Warner Building theater in D.C. some 
 15
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years earlier.56  Sameric argued that the landmark designation of 
the theater was inappropriate as the public could gain no 
benefit from a private interior.57  Having poached a dead 
argument, Sameric might have anticipated the court’s reasoning 
in rejecting it: Quoting Weinberg, the court held that “numerous 
conceivable private uses of the interiors of buildings which are 
compatible with public viewing of the area.”58 
After thus dispensing with Sameric’s arguments, the court 
took the unusual step of drawing out the logical conclusions of 
its reasoning.  It noted, as discussed above, that if preserving 
historic resources is itself an acceptable public purpose, 
justifying the use of the police power, public viewing of these 
interiors (or any viewing at all!) becomes superfluous.59   
The Sameric court uses the conservative side of this 
reasoning to make the point that the government must preserve 
landmark interiors with the outlook that some future use may 
well give the public access.60  In the court’s own words, “the 
Commonwealth must execute a farsightedness which, at times will 
necessarily transcend private interests.”61 This is the inverted 
version of Teacher Insurance and Annuity Association’s (TIAA) 
argument, discussed infra and rejected by that court, that 
                                                 
56 Id. at 157, 158. 
57 Id. at 158. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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because its restaurant might some day be converted into a wholly 
private space, landmark designation should be withheld.62  Here 
the argument is that because some day the protected interior 
might become public, landmark preservation should be allowed.63 
Though this court’s reasoning was more tempered, might one 
cite Sameric as pointing to the proposition that the government 
would serve the public interest by landmarking interiors that 
never have been and are never likely to be open to the public?   
 
Shubert Organization (1991) 
 
In the mid-1980s, the New York City Landmarks Preservation 
Commission undertook a project of designation for historic 
Broadway theaters.64  The project eventually culminated in the 
designation of 28 theaters.65  Only two of the theaters’ 
interiors were not designated landmarks.66  Petitioners brought 
suit claiming that the method of designation of landmarks 
outlined by the Preservation Statute affected a per se violation 
of the Takings Clause.67 
                                                 
62 Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America v. City of New York, 82 N.Y.2d 35, 
43 (1993). 
63 Sameric, 558 A.2d at 158. 
64 Shubert Org. Inc. v. Landmarks Pres. Comm’n, 570 N.Y.S.2d 504, 506 (1991). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 505. 
 17
Johnathan Lloyd, Historic Preservation, Tersh Boasberg 
The court held that Penn Central controlled under the facts 
of the case.68  Since the Supreme Court in that case had already 
found New York’s Preservation statute constitutionally sound, 
the court saw no need to reason further.69 
On the petitioner’s claim that the statute produced a 
taking as applied, the court likewise found no merit.70  
Petitioners had failed to meet their burden of showing that the 
designation of the 28 theaters in question deprived them of 
“essential use of their property.”71 
Interestingly, petitioners in this case also raised in 
support of their claims of constitutional violation, the 
argument that the landmark designation of the theaters was a 
pretext for protecting the theater industry.72  Landmarking for 
this purpose was impermissible under the New York City 
Administrative Code.  The Code expressly forbad the Commission 
from using its authority “to regulate and restrict the locations 
of trades and industries or location of buildings designed for 
specific uses.”73 
From one point of view, it looks as though the actions of 
the New York City Commission fall neatly into the category of 
proscribed conduct; it was, after all, attempting to landmark 28 
                                                 
68 Id. at 508. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 507. 
73 N.Y.C. Admin. Code §  25-304(a). 
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theaters within only a few block of one another.  This might 
certainly have been seen as “regulat[ing…the] location of 
buildings designed for specific uses.” 
The Shubert court deftly overcame this allegation of 
improper use of authority, however.  It stated: 
Although manipulation of the landmarks law for the 
purpose of preserving the Broadway theatre industry, 
rather than individual theatres, would have been 
improper, the designation proceedings addressed the 
specific buildings in terms of the criteria of the 
law. Accordingly, the administrative determination was 
based on substantial evidence, was not arbitrary and 
capricious, and did not violate the law.74 
 
The Teachers Insurance court (whose decision is discussed 
infra) would later cite this judgment as making the New York 
City Administrative Code provision tantamount to “a prohibition 
against the use of landmark designations for zoning purposes.”75   
Thus the actions of the Preservation Commission may 
permissibly bear a very strong resemblance to zoning, as they 
did in this case.  It appears that the Commission may designate 
as many buildings used for a single purpose in as small an area 
as it likes.  The Commission need only ensure that each 
individual building meets the legal criteria for designation, 
and it will screen its action against attack. 
 Perhaps this case’s greatest contribution to the armor that 
protects interior preservation came out of its citation to Penn 
                                                 
74 Shubert, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 507. 
75 Teachers Ins., 82 N.Y.2d at 44. 
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Central.76  That case, as we have already mentioned, had nothing 
to do with interior preservation.  However, when the Shubert 
court cited to it in support of interior designation against a 
per se takings challenge in this case, later courts (Teachers 
Insurance, to be specific) came to interpret the citation as 
extending the Penn Central doctrine to interior designation.77 
 
Lucas v. South Carolina (1992) 
 
 Lucas’ 2 lots on either side of the house in the center 
 
Lucas’ connection to the field of historic preservation may 
seem somewhat attenuated.  Although the case’s facts originate 
                                                 
76Shubert, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 508. 
77 Teachers Ins., 586 N.Y.S.2d at 263 (1992). 
 20
Johnathan Lloyd, Historic Preservation, Tersh Boasberg 
at the birthplace of American historic preservation law, near 
Charleston, South Carolina, the case itself has nothing to do 
with historic preservation.78  The Lucas decision, however, 
serves as a much-needed sequel to the oblique takings doctrine 
of Penn Central. 
The facts are as follows: Lucas bought two lots of 
residential beachfront property where he planned to build 
single-family homes.79  Two years after this purchase, South 
Carolina’s state legislature enacted the Beachfront Management 
Act, which aimed to prevent the dangerous effects of erosion on 
beachfront property.80   
Lucas brought suit against the Coastal Council alleging 
that the new State statute effected a taking as applied to his 
case.81  The statute, which placed Lucas’ property in a zone 
where new construction was forbidden, effectively rendered his 
two formerly valuable beachfront lots valueless.82 
Prior to coming before the United States Supreme Court, the 
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the Beachfront Management 
Act had no Constitutional flaw.83  Relying on U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent, the court held that the statute properly addressed 
itself to the regulation of “harmful or noxious uses,” and that 
                                                 
78 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
79 Id. at 1008. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1009. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1010. 
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in such cases no compensation was required, regardless of the 
statute’s effect on property value.84 
The U.S. Supreme Court found that its own doctrine on 
“harmful or noxious uses” did not apply to the facts of Lucas.85  
Instead, the Court held that any regulation that affects a one-
hundred percent diminution in the value of real property is 
compensable as a taking.86  The principle holds, said the Court, 
regardless of the public interest advanced by such a 
regulation.87 
 Like Penn Central, this case has, ostensibly, no nexus to 
interior preservation.  Also like Penn Central, however, its 
application is integral to a complete understanding of the 
protections surrounding interior preservation. 
 In one sense, this case is one of a very few that opens the 
door, albeit only slightly, to takings claims.  The case does 
stand for the proposition that a one hundred percent diminution 
in value will constitute a taking and is compensable.   
 In another sense, however, this case can be seen as 
creating a very strict definition of what will in fact 
constitute a taking requiring compensation.  Before Lucas, 
courts were aware that there was a nebulous boundary between 
permissible zoning and landmarking and impermissible takings.  
                                                 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1026. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1031. 
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Not having a precise standard may have caused courts to err on 
the side of safety, compensating for more actions than would 
later prove compensable under the one hundred percent standard 
articulated in Lucas.88  
Richard Lazarus, of Georgetown University Law Center, 
arrives at precisely that conclusion:  Although many view Lucas 
as a boon to private property rights advocates, Scalia’s per se 
rule in the Lucas opinion has made showing a taking more and not 
less difficult.  Lazarus puts it this way: 
The property rights movement had, in effect, been 
seduced by Scalia’s rhetoric in Lucas and sought to 
squeeze all of their takings claims into the Lucas 
rubric. But […] courts routinely concluded that 
economic value remained and therefore Lucas did not 
apply. […]  There have literally been hundreds of 
cases since Lucas in which courts had maintained a 
Lucas taking. But in more than fifteen years of 
litigation, there are only a handful of cases in 
either federal or state court, fewer than ten, in 
which courts have in fact relied on Lucas in 
concluding that a taking in fact occurred.89  
 
Indeed, a Penn Central takings analysis, while still a high bar, 
offered those seeking to style interior designations as 
“takings” a fairer prospect than they now face in the wake of 
Lucas. 
 
                                                 
88 Lazarus, Richard, Lucas Unspun, 16 Southeastern Envt’l L. J. Issue #1 
(2007), available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/lazarus/docs/publications/Lazarus_Lucas
_Unspun_Forthcoming2007.pdf 
89 Id. 
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Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America v. New 
York (1992) 
 
  
The Seagram Building with interior views of the Four Seasons restaurant 
 
 
The property at issue in this case was the interior of the 
Four Seasons restaurant in the Seagram Building in New York 
 24
Johnathan Lloyd, Historic Preservation, Tersh Boasberg 
City.90  The building itself as well as the restaurant are 
executed in the International Style.91  The building is the only 
example of the work of celebrated Bauhaus architect Ludwig Mies 
van der Rohe in New York City.92  The restaurant, whose interior 
decoration is the work of American designer Philip Johnson, has 
remained architecturally unchanged since it opened in 1959.93  
The restaurant’s design has known much praise – one New York 
Times article called it “one of the finest restaurant interiors 
ever made anywhere, in any era.”94  
After the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission 
landmarked the building and the restaurant’s interior, TIAA 
brought suit challenging the designation, alleging, among other 
arguments, a per se taking without just compensation.95  Citing 
Shubert, the lower court held that the preservation statute was 
immune from per se takings challenges where the claim is based 
on a restricted use of property.96 
Once again, the Teachers Insurance court was also faced 
with the argument that the designation of the Four Seasons 
interior was actually a pretext for impermissibly protecting the 
                                                 
90 Teachers Ins., 82 N.Y.2d at 39. 
91 Id. at 40. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 39. 
94 Rothstein, 26 Conn.L.Rev. at 1124. 
95 586 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (1992) 
96 Id. 
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existing use of the space.97  This court gave no more weight to 
the pretext argument than the Shubert court had done.  In 
rejecting the claim of pretext, the court reasoned that it does 
not follow that just because the space’s optimum use considering 
the designation is probably as a restaurant, that the 
designation mandates the space’s continued use as such.98  In 
other words, eliminating the most profitable possible uses for 
an interior is not the same as requiring one specific use only. 
TIAA argued in addition that the designation of the 
restaurant’s interior impermissibly included elements that were 
not fixtures of the space.99  The court handily added this to the 
list of TIAA’s failed arguments.  It reasoned that the features 
in question (sculptures) were sufficiently connected to the 
restaurant’s interior to fall within the meaning of the 
applicable regulation.100  The court concluded simply that the 
regulation in question “does not distinguish between personalty 
and realty.”101 
TIAA appealed the decision of the New York Supreme Court.102 
On appeal before the New York Court of Appeals, TIAA 
abandoned any hope of prevailing on constitutional grounds.103  
                                                 
97 Id. at 264. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Teachers Ins., 82 N.Y.2d at 41. 
103 Id. 
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The Association alleged only that the New York preservation 
statute gave no authority for interior designations.104  It seems 
apparent that TIAA had read the writing on the wall by this 
time: interior designations appear by all accounts invincible to 
takings challenges. 
Even unencumbered by the constitutional challenge, TIAA 
must have realized that its appeal would be an uphill battle; 
the New York City Landmarks Law explicitly authorized landmark 
designation for interiors older than 30 years.105  The code does 
specify, however, that the space must be open to the public or 
be one “customarily open or accessible to the public, or to 
which the public is customarily invited.”106  The argument 
against designation centered on the claim that a fundamental 
difference exists between the character of truly “public” spaces 
like lobbies, theaters, and train stations and “ordinary 
commercial space[s].”107  The difference, TIAA argued, is that 
the former are “dedicated to public use.”108 
The court rejected TIAA’s distinction, finding no 
difference between the nature of the public’s access to a 
restaurant or its access to a theater or any other private space 
                                                 
104 Id. 
105 Id. § 25-302(a)(2). 
106 New York City, N.Y., Admin. Code § 25-302(m). 
107 Teachers Ins., 82 N.Y.2d at 42. 
108 Id. at 43. 
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which depends on public patronage for its viability.109 Nor, the 
court reasoned, did the Landmark Law itself make any distinction 
in the nature of various varieties of interior spaces.110 
TIAA proffered one last-ditch argument against designation.  
It argued that even though the space was currently leased by a 
restaurant and therefore accessible to the public, it might one 
day be adapted to a strictly private purpose.111  The interior 
would become by that token outside the scope of the code which 
requires public access for designation to be permissible.112  The 
court recognized that this reasoning taken to its logical 
conclusion leads to the absurd result that any interior that 
might possibly be converted to a private use in the future can 
never be a landmark.113 
 
United Artists’ (1993) 
 
This case is the reargument of the appeal of Sameric to the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.114   
In the original appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
reversed the decision below, and held that,  
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 44. 
112 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
113 Teachers Ins., 82 N.Y.2d at 44. 
114 United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612 
(1993). 
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…the “Historic Buildings, Structures, Sites, Objects 
and Districts” provisions of the Philadelphia Code 
(Section 14-2007), which authorize the historic 
designation of private property-in this case the Boyd 
Theater-without the consent of the owner, are unfair, 
unjust and amount to an unconstitutional taking 
without just compensation in violation of Article 1, 
Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.115  
 
Interestingly, the court did not make any distinction 
between interior and exterior designation.  It struck down the 
entire historic preservation ordinance.116  One author summarizes 
the decision in this way: 
There is plenty of opportunity for serious 
constitutional discussion of real problems involved in 
landmark designation, but not much such discussion in 
the majority opinion.  Characteristic of the 
prevailing tone is a heavy reliance on a long-
discredited Pennsylvania (anti-)zoning opinion dating 
from 1926.[…] About the closest thing to legal 
reasoning in the opinion are two references, just in 
passing, to two pro-developer rationales – that a 
private owner cannot validly be required to share a 
public burden, which should be borne by all taxpayers, 
and that the validity of zoning depended on the fact 
that it involved “an average reciprocity of 
advantage.117 
 
This was the first time a state court had dismissed Penn 
Central to hold that it interpreted takings differently under 
the state constitution than under the federal Constitution.118  
                                                 
115 United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6, 
13 (1991). 
116 Id. at 14. 
117 Williams and Taylor, supra note 16. 
118 Daniel T. Cavarello, From Penn Central to United Artists’ I & II: The Rise 
to Immunity of Historic Preservation Designation from Successful Takings 
Challenges, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 593, 610 (1995). 
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The contention that United Artists’ excited prompted the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to hear reargument of the 
constitutional elements of the case.119  
This Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which one author described 
as “deeply riven by various internal controversies,” took two 
years to issue its opinion on the reargument.120  Chief Justice 
Nix wrote the opinion with which three other judges agreed.121  
One judge reiterated the past decision in a dissent, and two 
more did not participate.122  
In this decision, the court held to the Penn Central 
precedent and found that the case’s facts did not give rise to a 
taking under the federal Constitution.123 
The court’s consideration of the facts under the 
Pennsylvania constitution lead it to consider the federal 
takings precedent it had rejected on its first hearing of the 
case.124  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the takings 
analysis used by federal courts, which it set forth as follows: 
1) the interest of the general public, rather than a 
particular class of persons, must require governmental 
action; 
2) the means must be necessary to effectuate that 
purpose; 
3) the means must not be unduly oppressive upon the 
property holder, considering the economic impact of 
                                                 
119 Williams and Taylor, supra note 16. 
120 Williams and Taylor, supra note 16. 
121 United Artists’ II, 635 A.2d at 614. 
122 Id. at 622. 
123 Id. at 620. 
124 Id. at 619. 
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the regulation, and the extent to which the government 
physically intrudes upon the property.125 
 
Under this analysis, the court found no taking.126  The 
court upheld the power of the Commission to undertake historic 
preservation, but only through exterior designation.127  The 
enabling legislation, reasoned the court, specifically referred 
to the upkeep and maintenance of landmarks’ exteriors, but only 
mentioned the maintenance of interiors insofar as such was 
necessary to preserve the structure’s exterior.128  The 
Commission had therefore acted without authority in designating 
the Boyd Theater’s interior and the designation was vacated.129 
The major contribution to protecting interior preservation 
made by this case lies in its recognition of the Edmunds 
principles of federal and state statutory interpretation.130  
Pennsylvania had tried to “make its own way” by interpreting its 
own constitutional takings clause outside the prescribed methods 
used for federal takings. Until Pennsylvania joined the rest of 
the states, it left the possibility open that each state would 
be its own “loose cannon,” with its own interpretation of 
takings.  This would have rendered interior preservation’s 
takings victories in federal court all but useless.  
                                                 
125 Id. at 618. 
126 Id. at 620. 
127 Id. at 622. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 615. 
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Pennsylvania’s decision to adopt the standard interpretation 
method ensures that the very favorable federal takings doctrine 
will be applicable in the states as well. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, it seems clear that the field of interior 
preservation is riddled with treasures for the academic and 
legal mind.  This area too long neglected must reclaim the 
attention of legal scholars and practitioners.  
Take, for example, the 18th and 19th-century houses of some 
of the nation’s oldest historic districts.  The exterior 
architectural elements of these buildings are already protected 
by landmark designations, although only a few, if any of their 
interiors benefit form any kind of legal protection.  How can 
historic preservation commissions avoid the reproof this paper 
directs at scholars and practitioners for neglecting interior 
preservation?  Can they claim that the interior architecture of 
the 18th and 19th centuries is of lesser quality than that of 
the exterior?  Do the Greek and Roman revival, Neoclassical, 
Victorian, Beaux-Arts, Art Nouveau, Art Deco, Modern and 
International styles manifest themselves only in exterior 
architectural elements? 
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Indeed, in D.C., Philadelphia, and New York, as elsewhere, 
private homes often hold the best (and best-preserved) examples 
of historic architecture.  Why have preservation commissions 
failed to protect these invaluable resources? 
Perhaps some local commissions still lack the express 
authority to make interior landmark designations.  In light of 
the many protections surrounding interior preservation, should 
local commissions like D.C. and others, whose preservation 
statutes include no specific authority to designate interiors 
now make the effort to have such terms expressly included?  The 
precedent described here will probably keep interior designation 
safe from takings attacks, even in localities where there is no 
express authority to make them.  However, such cases may give 
rise to new due process challenges currently outside interior 
preservation’s known territory.  What are these potential 
attacks?  Is interior preservation prepared to face them? 
And there are other issues, too – does the armor whose 
construction has been outlined here provide too much protection 
for old buildings and not enough for people?  How might courts 
use the existing doctrines of interior preservation to 
accomplish even more ambitious preservation goals?  What is the 
potential for abuse of this highly protected area of law? 
All these and other question wait to be explored in a field 
overgrown with exciting and novel issues ripe for examination. 
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